Environmental policy and directed technological change : evidence from the European carbon market by CALEL, Raphael & DECHEZLEPRÊTRE, Antoine
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2013/09 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Climate Policy Research Unit 
Environmental Policy and Directed Technological 
Change: Evidence from the European carbon market 
 
Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Climate Policy Research Unit 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Policy and Directed Technological Change: 
Evidence from the European carbon market  
 
  
 Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/09 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre, 2013 
Printed in Italy, March 2013 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano 
Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
Climate Policy Research Unit 
The Climate Policy Research Unit (CPRU) is a research group within the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies under the Loyola de Palacio Chair. The goal of the CPRU is to provide a reliable 
source for information and analysis of EU climate policy and a forum for discussion of research 
carried out in this area among government officials, academics and industry. 
The CPRU was established in 2010 at the initiative of Josep Borrell, President of the EUI and former 
President of the European Parliament, as a means of providing more focus to European climate policy 
developments. The director of the CPRU is Denny Ellerman, part-time professor at the RSCAS, and 
recently retired as a Senior Lecturer from MIT's Sloan School of Management. The CPRU works in 
collaboration with the energy and regulatory policy research groups of the Florence School of 
Regulation and Loyola de Palacio Chair and with the Global Governance Programme at the EUI. 
Starting in 2012, the CPRU has been funded primarily by the European Commission (DG Climate 
Action).  
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not represent the views of the 
European University Institute or any of its subsidiary components or those of the European 
Commission. 
For more information:  
http://fsr.eui.eu/CPRU/Index.aspx 
  
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on technological 
change. We exploit installations-level inclusion criteria to estimate the impact of the EU ETS on firms 
patenting. We find that the EU ETS has increased low-carbon innovation among regulated firms by as 
much as 10%, while not crowding out patenting for other technologies. We also find evidence that the 
EU ETS has not impacted patenting beyond the set of regulated companies. These results imply that 
the EU ETS accounts for nearly a 1% increase in European lowcarbon patenting compared to a 
counterfactual scenario. 
Keywords 
Directed technological change, EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Policy evaluation. 
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1 Introduction
Emissions trading programs have assumed an ever more prominent role in environmen-
tal policy over the last few decades. In the US, the Acid Rain Program, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and California's cap-and-trade program are all ex-
amples of this trend. Australia, New Zealand, and the Canadian province of Quebec
have all recently created their own cap-and-trade programs to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions, and China, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil are individually making moves
toward launching their own. Global carbon markets are today worth over $175 billion
a year (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012), and with so many new initiatives in the works, this
number will likely grow much larger in years to come.
At present, most of the $175 billion a year is accounted for by the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). It launched in 2005, allocating tradable emissions
permits to over 12'000 power stations and industrial plants in 24 countries, accounting
for over 40% of the EU's total greenhouse gas emissions.2 It is today the world's largest
cap-and-trade program. Like all of the new emissions trading initiatives around the
globe, the primary aim of the EU ETS is to reduce carbon emissions, but to do so
through innovation rather than output reduction. When regulated rms expect to face
a higher price on emissions relative to other costs of production, this provides them with
an incentive to make operational changes and investments that reduce the emissions
intensity of their output. The \induced innovation" hypothesis, dating back to Sir John
Hicks (1932) and restated in the context of environmental policy by Porter (1991) and
Acemoglu et al. (2012), suggests that part of this new investment will be directed toward
developing and commercializing new emissions-reducing technologies. According to this
theory, the EU ETS can be expected to spur development of new low-carbon technologies.
This vision has been articulated many times by EU policy makers, who envisage the EU
ETS to be a driving force of low-carbon economic growth.
In this paper we conduct the rst comprehensive investigation of the impact of the EU
ETS on low-carbon technological change in the rst 5 years of the Scheme's existence.
The EU ETS oers a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of environmental
 For their insightful comments and generous advice, we owe a great thanks to Devin Caughey,
Sam Fankhauser, Matthieu Glachant, Bronwyn Hall, Ivan Hascic, Nick Johnstone, Carmen Marchiori,
David Popp, and Paul Rosenbaum. Participants of seminars and conferences in Asheville, Cambridge,
London, Madrid, Mannheim, Milan, Paris, Rome, Toulouse, Toxa and Venice have all improved the
paper. Raphael Calel is grateful for funding provided by the ESRC and the Jan Wallander and Tom
Hedelius Foundation. Antoine Dechezlepre^tre gratefully acknowledges the support of ADEME and of
the ESRC under the ESRC Postdoctoral Fellowship Scheme (award no: PTA-026-27-2756). The authors
would also like to thank Xavier Vollenweider for excellent research assistance.
224 countries were included from the beginning. 6 countries have joined since then.
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policy on technological change. It is the rst and largest environmental policy initiative of
its kind anywhere in the world, which by itself would make it an interesting case to study.
But more important is the fact that, in order to control administrative costs, the EU
ETS was designed to cover only large installations. Firms operating smaller installations
are not covered by EU ETS regulations, although the rms themselves might be just as
large as those aected by the regulations.3 Because innovation takes place at the level
of the rm, we can exploit these installation-level inclusion criteria to compare rms
with similar resources available for research and similar patenting histories, but which
have fallen under dierent regulatory regimes since 2005. This provides an opportunity
to apply the sort of quasi-experimental techniques most suited to assessing the causal
impacts of environmental policies (List et al., 2003; Greenstone and Gayer, 2009). Studies
employing these methods have found that environmental regulations inhibit new-plant
formation (List et al., 2003), but stimulate capital investment in existing plants (Fowlie,
2010). To the authors' knowledge, though, this is the rst time these methods have been
employed to study the impact of environmental policy on directed technological change.
We use a newly constructed data set that records patenting activities, key rm char-
acteristics, and regulatory status with respect to the EU ETS. Our data set includes
information on over 30 million rms across 23 countries, 18 of which took part in the
2005 launch of the EU ETS. We identify over 5'500 rms operating more than 9'000 in-
stallations regulated under the EU ETS, accounting for over 80% of EU ETS-wide emis-
sions. Using this data set, we are able to compare unregulated and would-be regulated
rms both before and after the EU ETS launched. The low-carbon patent classication
recently developed by the European Patent Oce (EPO) allows us to identify emissions
reduction technologies. A matched dierence-in-dierences study design enables us to
control for confounding factors that aect both regulated and unregulated rms (in-
put prices, sector- and country-specic policies, etc.), as well as rm-level heterogeneity
(Heckman et al., 1998b,a; Smith and Todd, 2005; Abadie, 2005). Our estimates provide
the rst comprehensive empirical assessment of the impact of the EU ETS on directed
technological change.
A casual look at aggregate patent data reveals a surge in low-carbon patenting since
2005. The increase appears larger among EU ETS regulated companies, and our matched
dierence-in-dierences estimate of the treatment eect implies that the EU ETS is
responsible for a 36.2% increase in low-carbon patenting among our matched sample of
3Although the EU ETS regulations are applied at the level of the installation, we will often use
`EU ETS rms' or `regulated rms' as shorthand for rms operating at least one EU ETS regulated
installation.
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3'428 EU ETS rms, or an increase of 8.1% across all of the 5'500 EU ETS rms. This
would account for less than a 1% increase of low-carbon patenting at the EPO. Put
another way, only 2% of the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting can be attributed
to the EU ETS.
With respect to concerns that low-carbon innovation would crowd out development
of other technologies (Popp and Newell, 2012), we nd evidence that the EU ETS has
in fact encouraged patenting for other technologies, but by a very small amount. We
investigate several challenges to the internal and external validity of our results|e.g.
omitted variable bias and a failure of `selection on observables'|but our conclusions
appear to be remarkably robust.
For fear that a focus on EU ETS rms would have blinkered us to a broader indirect
impact of the EU ETS, we identify 12'000 of likely third-party technology providers and
purchasers and test whether these rms have also responded to the EU ETS. The esti-
mates are only indicative, but we nd no compelling evidence that the EU ETS has had
either a net positive or net negative impact on the patenting activities of third parties.
Taken together, our ndings suggest that, while EU ETS regulated rms have responded
strongly, the Scheme so far has had at best a very limited impact on the overall pace and
direction of technological change. The EU ETS is expected to remain an integral part
of the EU's strategy for building a low-carbon Europe (European Commission, 2011),
but in its current form the EU ETS may not be providing incentives for low-carbon
technological change on a large scale.
Technological change may be the single most important determinant of the long-run
cost of emissions abatement. Consequently, the ability of an environmental policy to
inuence technological change is perhaps one of the most important criteria on which
to judge its success (Kneese and Schultze, 1975; Pizer and Popp, 2008). In light of this,
it is not surprising that there are ongoing eorts from both theoretical and empirical
economists to better understand the capacity of environmental policies to induce clean
innovation. On the theoretical side, the past few decades have seen the emergence of a
considerable literature further developing the induced innovation hypothesis, especially
in the context of climate change mitigation (Popp, 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2012).
On the empirical side, a large and growing research enterprise is trying to understand
and quantify the link between environmental policies and directed technological change,
often with innovation measured at the level of economic sectors or countries (Newell
et al., 1999; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2002; Aghion et al., 2012 and many
others. See Popp et al., 2009, Popp, 2010, and Ambec et al., 2010, for recent surveys).
Our study contributes to this literature, and analyzes the policy impacts at the rm-
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level. The handful of studies that have begun to investigate the innovation impact of the
EU ETS rely on interview-based methodologies and most analyze small unrepresentative
samples (Homann, 2007; Tomas et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011). Martin et al. (2011)
take extra precautions to ensure consistency across interviews with dierent rms, and
they conduct the largest study to date covering 450 EU ETS rms in 6 countries. We
use patent portfolios as an objective measure of technological change, and our study
considers over 5'500 EU ETS rms in 18 countries, accounting for roughly 80% of the
program as a whole. With this, we provide the rst comprehensive empirical estimates
of the Scheme's impact on directed technological change.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 surveys the evidence on environmental
policy and directed technological change, especially in the context of emissions trading.
Evidence from the US Acid Rain Program and early studies of the EU ETS inform
us about how the EU ETS is likely to have impacted technological change. In section
3 we familiarize ourselves with our newly constructed data set, and use it to begin
unpacking the characteristics of low-carbon technological change. In section 4 we turn
our eye to estimating the impact of the EU ETS on regulated rms, and in section 5 we
examine its indirect impact on third-party technology providers and purchasers. Section
6 summarizes and discusses the evidence in light of the broader empirical literature. We
conclude by considering some of the potential policy implications of our ndings, and
directions for future research.
2 Emissions trading and directed technological change
2.1 Empirical background
Several studies have found evidence that environmental policy does impact the direc-
tion of technological change (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003;
Popp, 2002, 2003, 2006; Arimura et al., 2007; Lanoie et al., 2007). Popp (2006) nds
an almost immediate patenting response to domestic clean air regulations in the US,
Germany, and Japan. Johnstone et al. (2010) nd that renewable energy patents have
increased dramatically as national and international climate change policies have mul-
tiplied. But while policy makers continue making this argument, and though there is
empirical evidence to support a general link between environmental policy and directed
technological change, a more careful reading of the literature yields two cautionary ob-
servations that seem particularly relevant for the EU ETS.
Firstly, when examining the impact of emissions trading programs specically, rather
4
Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre
than environmental policies more broadly construed, the conclusions about its impacts
are more modest. Most earlier studies consider the US Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Pro-
gram, launched in 1995. Early estimates suggested nearly half of the emissions reductions
were achieved by installing scrubber technology, and the remainder by switching to coal
with a lower sulphur content (Schmalensee et al., 1998). The scrubber technology existed
before 1995, but had in many instances not been economically viable. The innovation
resulting from the Acid Rain Program thus appears to have been focused on operational
rather than technological change (Burtraw, 2000). Yet there is some evidence of very
narrowly directed technological change. Popp (2003) detects an increase in patents that
improved the eciency of scrubbers.4 This eect was conned to early years under the
new regime though, and the Program has not provided ongoing incentives for technolog-
ical advancement (Lange and Bellas, 2005). This squares with ndings that the use of
scrubber technology as an emissions abatement strategy has actually declined over time
(Burtraw and Szambelan, 2009). To put it simply, past emissions trading programs like
the Acid Rain Program do not provide a precedent for the kind of induced technological
change EU policy makers are hoping the EU ETS will provide.
Secondly, if we expected the incentives for technological development to be mediated
primarily by augmenting energy prices, we can use historical estimates of the energy
price elasticity of energy-saving technology patents to give us a very rough idea of the
potential eect the EU ETS might be having. Popp (2002) suggests that, even at the
height of the energy crisis of the late 1970s, energy prices only boosted patenting by
3.14%. The carbon price in the EU ETS, having ranged from a peak of near e30 to
a low of near e0 (and spending more time in the lower part of that range), does not
imply anything close to the energy price hikes of the late 1970s. One might therefore
expect the patenting response, if any, to be barely perceptible. This back-of-the-envelope
comparison comes with serious health warnings, of course, not the least of which is that
innovation may be driven more by expectations than currently prevailing prices (Martin
et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it can help aid our expectations about the likely impact of
the EU ETS.
So while policy makers envisage the EU ETS as the engine of low-carbon innovation,
and though there is empirical evidence that supports a positive link between environmen-
tal policy and directed technological change generally, the two observations above|the
weak patenting response in previous emissions trading programs, and the meager patent-
4It is worth noting that Title IV of the Clean Air Act, which establishes the Acid Rain Program, also
includes special provisions that reward rms specically for the use of scrubbers. It is not entirely clear,
therefore, how much was `the market's doing'.
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ing response to be expected from the diluted price signal|invite a degree of skepticism
about strong claims for the ability of the EU ETS to promote innovation. These two
observations, moreover, motivate a special interest in providing policy makers with di-
rect empirical evidence on whether or not the EU ETS is encouraging rms to develop
new low-carbon technologies.
2.2 The EU ETS and directed technological change
In 2005, the EU ETS launched in 24 countries across Europe, covering roughly 40%
of the EU's total greenhouse gas emissions. First, power stations and industrial plants
across Europe were classied according to their main activity: \combustion", \cement",
\paper and pulp", etc. For each category, installations had to meet certain criteria to be
included in the EU ETS. For instance, only combustion installations historically consum-
ing more than 20 MWh a year were covered. The Scheme would then be implemented in
3 trading phases, with successively more stringent emissions caps for each phase. Phase
1, which ran from 2005{2007, was insulated from later phases by prohibiting banking
and borrowing of permits across the phase boundary. Phase 2 (2008{2011) and Phase 3
(2012{2020) allow rms to bank unused permits for later use, as well as a limited form of
borrowing against future emissions reductions. For each year in Phase 1, over 2 billion
tons-worth of tradable emissions permits were allocated to the more than 12'000 qualify-
ing power stations and industrial plants, and a legal requirement was instituted that each
installation surrender enough permits at the end of each year to cover their emissions.
Prior to the compliance date, however, installation operators could freely trade permits
with each other (as well as with nancial intermediaries and private citizens).5 The price
of emitting one ton of CO2 would be set in this newly created marketplace. Since 2005,
the spot price has varied between e0 and e30, spending more time in the lower part of
that range. The price of forward contracts has remained steadily above the spot price,
though, suggesting rms are taking the progressive stringency of the cap into account.
With the price of carbon revealed in the market, installations (or rather the rms that
operate them) can then make abatement and investment decisions accordingly.
Since it launched in 2005, there has been vigorous debate about whether the EU ETS
would induce rms to develop new emissions-reducing technologies, many arguing that
an overly generous allocation of emissions permits would largely undermine the incentives
to innovate (Schleich and Betz, 2005; Gagelmann and Frondel, 2005; Grubb et al., 2005).
Indeed, a few early case studies summarized by Petsonk and Cozijnsen (2007) indicate
5See Ellerman et al. (2010) for a more comprehensive review of the design and implementation of the
EU ETS.
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that rather than developing new technologies, rms have been introducing well-known
technological solutions that had simply not been economically viable before the EU
ETS imposed a carbon price on regulated rms. A growing literature of case-studies
and expert interviews now provides further support for this conclusion. Tomas et al.
(2010) study four large EU ETS regulated Portuguese chemical companies, suggesting
that the EU ETS may have encouraged some energy eciency improvements. Martin
et al. (2011) conduct interviews with nearly 800 European manufacturing rms, of which
almost 450 operated some EU ETS regulated installations. Using their interview-based
measure of innovation, they nd a positive eect of the expected future stringency of EU
ETS. Few studies have inquired directly about R&D or patenting, however. A survey
of Irish EU ETS rms tentatively suggests that almost no resources were available for
low-carbon R&D in Phase 1 of the trading program (2005{2007), while many of the rms
had pursued more operational innovations like installing new machinery or equipment,
making process or behavioral changes, and employing fuel switching to some degree
(Anderson et al., 2011). Homann (2007), reporting on the German electricity sector,
nd that the EU ETS has had an eect on decisions about small-scale investments with
short amortization times, but not on R&D eorts. Neither study, however, provides a
suciently large or representative sample of EU ETS rms to provide a reliable picture of
the innovation response to the EU ETS, especially since innovation tends to be relatively
concentrated to a small group of rms. Moreover, neither study oers for comparison a
group of non-EU ETS rms.
What evidence there is suggests that the practice of fuel switching appears to have
been very important so far. Fuel switching requires neither capital investment nor R&D,
only that power providers bring less polluting gas-red plants online before coal-red
ones as demand ramps up. This changes the average fuel mix in favor of natural gas,
and therefore reduces the carbon intensity of output. Fuel switching is a purely organi-
zational innovation. Macroeconomic estimates suggest that the EU ETS reduced total
emissions by roughly 50{100 million tons of CO2 annually in Phase 1, or roughly 3{6%,
compared with a \business-as-usual" scenario (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Anderson
and Di Maria, 2011). Meanwhile, model-based estimates of power sector emissions abate-
ment from fuel switching alone range from 26{88 million tons per year (Delarue et al.,
2008, 2010). These estimates suggest that fuel switching very likely accounts for the lion
share of emissions reductions in the EU ETS so far. This is not a problem in and of
itself, of course. As mentioned earlier, the US Acid Rain Program achieved its emissions
targets in large part by analogous fuel switching strategies, and with little technological
change. However, one should be conscious that in the case of the EU ETS, the capac-
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ity for emissions reductions through fuel switching is far more limited compared to the
EU's longer term targets. Delarue et al. (2008) estimate that fuel switching has the
potential to reduce emission by up to 300 million tons per year, which is no more than a
tenth of what is needed to meet the EU target to cut emissions by 80% by 2050 against
1990-levels.6
All of this provides only fragmentary or indirect evidence on directed technological
change, however. Our purpose, next, is to obtain more direct empirical evidence on
whether or not the EU ETS is encouraging rms to develop new low-carbon technologies.
3 Unpacking low-carbon technological change
While EU ETS regulations apply at the level of the installation, innovation takes place
at the level of the rm, and recent advances in linking patent data with company data
makes it possible to construct rm-level patent portfolios. This paper exploits a newly
constructed patent data set|linking patent portfolios to key rm characteristics, includ-
ing whether or not the rm operates any installations covered by EU ETS regulations.
Patents have been used extensively as a measure of technological change in the recent
induced innovation literature (Popp, 2002, 2006; Johnstone et al., 2010; Aghion et al.,
2012), and the advantages and drawbacks of patents are well understood (see OECD,
2009, for a survey). Patents provide a useful measure of the output of innovative activity
and are available at a highly disaggregated technological level. Having said that, it is
also worth noting that a number of studies have found that patent counts (output) are
highly correlated with R&D expenditures (input) in cross section (Griliches, 1984), and
shift concurrently over time and in response to shocks (Kaufer, 1989). Our main measure
of technological change uses patents led with the European Patent Oce (EPO). EPO
patents provide a common measure of innovation for all of Europe, unlike self-reported
innovation measures or patents led with national patent oces, for which the standards
vary from rm-to-rm or country-to-country. In addition, EPO patents provide a useful
quality threshold as only high value inventions typically get patented at the EPO.7
Nevertheless, as a robustness test we also repeat our analysis to using quality-weighted
patent counts.8
6The EU target amounts to reducing annual emissions by roughly 4'500 million tons compared to
1990, or roughly 3'500 million tons compared to current emission levels.
7Evidence shows that the highest value technologies are patented in several countries (Harho et al.,
2003), and indeed, one of the methods used to measure the value of patents is to count the number of
countries is which they are led (van Zeebroeck, 2011). Patents led at the EPO get patented in 6 EPO
member countries on average.
8Although the EPO provides a common measure of minimum patent quality, the value of patents
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All patents led at the EPO are categorized using the European patent classication
(ECLA), which includes a recently developed class pertaining to \technologies or applica-
tions for mitigation or adaptation against climate change", or \low-carbon technologies"
for short. This new category (the \Y02" class) is the result of an unprecedented eort
by the European Patent Oce, whereby patent examiners specialized in each technol-
ogy, with the help of external experts, developed a tagging system of patents related to
climate change mitigation technologies. The Y02 category provides the most accurate
tagging of climate change mitigation patents available today and is becoming the inter-
national standard for clean innovation studies9. These low-carbon technologies include,
to name a few, ecient combustion technologies (e.g. combined heat and power genera-
tion), carbon capture and storage, ecient electricity distribution (e.g., smart grids) and
energy storage (e.g. fuel cells). This class helps us measure the direction of technological
change.10 A complete description of the various sub-classes for low-carbon patents used
in the paper can be found in appendix C.
The EPO was set up in 1978. Since then, over 2.5 million patents have been led with
the EPO, of which just over 50'000 (or 2%) have been classied as low-carbon inventions.
Our newly constructed data set includes the patent portfolios of over 30 million rms
located in 23 countries (22 EU countries, plus the US). 18 of these countries launched
the EU ETS in 2005. The other 5 (Norway, Switzerland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the
US) have either joined later or have remained outside of the EU ETS altogether. While
our data is somewhat more geographically restricted than the EPO, the rms in our
data set account for just over 95% of all patents led at the EPO, so we are condent
that we have managed to include the patent history of the vast majority of companies.11
is still known to be heterogeneous. We use two ways to account for the quality of patents: forward
citations and family size. Citation data have been widely used in the literature to control for the quality
of patents. With this method, patents are weighted by the number of times each of them is cited in
subsequent patents (see Trajtenberg, 1990; Harho et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2005). The family of a patent
is the set of patents protecting the same invention in various countries (patent family information comes
from the DOCDB family table in PATSTAT). Counting the number of countries in which a patent is led
is another common measure of patent quality (Harho et al., 2003; van Zeebroeck, 2011). Family data
also presents the advantage of being more rapidly available than citations (patents are typically mostly
cited two years after their publication, hence four years after they are rst led), which is especially
valuable when dealing with very recent patents as we do. Finally, in some of our robustness tests we
also consider on patents led with national patent oces to gauge whether our ndings depend on how
narrowly we dene the patents of interest.
9See (Veefkind et al., 2012) for more details on how this category was constructed.
10Because the EPO low-carbon classication is not comprehensive, we also test the robustness of
our results to the inclusion of additional patents that other authors have considered low-carbon, in
particular patents pertaining to energy-ecient industrial processes. An updated list of environment-
related patent classication codes is available from the OECD's Environmental Policy and Technological
Innovation (EPTI) website: www.oecd.org/environment/innovation.
11We have also conducted extensive manual double-checking, so we can reasonably assume that com-
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The share of patents protecting low-carbon technologies shows a distinct pattern over
time (gure 1). There was a surge in patenting for these technologies in the early 1980s,
often attributed to the second oil price shock in the late 1970s (Dechezlepre^tre et al.,
2011). The share of low-carbon patents led each year then stayed roughly level until
the mid-1990s, after which it began to rise again. The share of low-carbon patents has
increased rapidly in recent years, as is particularly evident after 2005, with the share
doubling from 2% to 4% in just a few years. A simple Chow test strongly rejects the
hypothesis that there is no structural break in 2005 (P < 0:001).
Figure 1: Share of low-carbon patents (1978{2009)
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While this pattern is robust to using an expanded denition of \low-carbon technolo-
gies", it is not present for any set of environmentally friendly technologies. To see this,
gure 1 also plots the share of patents protecting non-greenhouse gas \pollution control
technologies", as dened by Popp (2006),12 which does not display the same structural
break (one cannot reject the hypothesis of no structural break in 2005 at conventional
signicance levels). The sudden surge in patenting activity, therefore, appears to be spe-
cic to low-carbon technologies and to coincide with the launch of the EU ETS. Could
the structural break in low-carbon patenting, then, be a consequence of the EU ETS?
Just like the increase in low-carbon patenting in the early 1980s has been attributed
to the oil price shock, the recent surge might be due to rising oil prices. When comparing
the share of low-carbon patenting with the evolution of oil prices (see gure 2), one
notices that the present upsurge in patenting follows immediately on the heels of rapid
panies for which we were unable to nd any patent data have actually not led any patent at the EPO.
It is well documented that only a fraction of companies ever le patents, and this is likely to be especially
true of the EPO that has high administrative costs.
12These technologies pertain to reduction of local pollutants including SO2 and NOX .
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oil price increases in the early 2000s. Patenting for pollution control, on the other
hand, was not responsive to the oil price in the 1980s, and so it is not surprising it has
stayed at recently. Looking at the aggregate trends over time, clearly, is not enough to
determine whether the increase in low-carbon patenting since 2005 is the result of the
EU ETS, oil prices, or some other factor. In order to isolate the impact of the EU ETS
we must compare the experience of rms regulated under the EU ETS with those not
covered by the regulation. Both groups will have faced the same oil prices and other
macroeconomic conditions, but starting in 2005 they were subject to dierent regulatory
regimes.
Figure 2: Share of low-carbon patents and Crude oil price(1978{2009)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
1
2
3
4
5
S
ha
re
 o
f p
at
en
ts
 (i
n 
%
)
Low-carbon patents
Crude oil price
EU ETS
Year
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
20
10
 U
S
D
It is important to stress that the EU ETS regulates installations (not rms) by ap-
plying certain inclusion criteria. For instance, installations for which the main activity is
\combustion of fuels" are included only if their annual thermal input exceeds a threshold
of 20 MW. For steel plants, the relevant inclusion criterion is instead that the installation
have a production capacity exceeding 2.5 tonnes per hour. Installations manufacturing
glass and glass bre are included only if their melting capacity exceeds 20 tonnes per day.
These are only three examples from a longer list, but the upshot of this conguration is
that what we refer to as EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms can in principle be virtually
identical in all other respects relevant to their patenting behaviour, except for the size
of a single installation.
Our data set also records the regulatory status of 30 million rms|5'568 rms in our
data set operate at least one installation regulated under the EU ETS. Together they
operate 9'358 EU ETS regulated installations, accounting for over 90% of regulated
installations and emissions in Phase 1 in the 18 EU ETS countries we are studying, and
11
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roughly 80% of installations and emissions EU ETS-wide (see table 1).13
Table 1: Coverage of the EU ETS { The rst two columns of this table show the number of Phase 1
installations in each of the 18 countries in our sample, and their allocated emissions (source: CITL). The
following two columns show the percentages of installations and emissions for which the operating rm has
been identied. The two rows at the foot of the table summarise our data set's EU ETS coverage for our 18
countries as well as as a proportion of the EU ETS as a whole.
Number of Mton of Percent of Percent of
installations emissions installations covered emissions covered
Austria 217 97.8 92.2 100.0
Belgium 345 178.7 98.6 100.0
Czech Rep. 415 290.8 92.5 96.9
Denmark 399 93.1 92.7 95.2
Estonia 54 56.3 77.8 99.9
Finland 637 133.9 84.6 100.0
France 1100 450.2 97.5 99.6
Germany 1944 1486.3 98.6 99.6
Ireland 121 57.7 76.9 94.7
Lithuania 113 34.4 87.6 91.4
Luxembourg 15 9.7 100.0 100.0
Netherlands 418 259.3 87.1 95.6
Poland 869 712.7 90.0 98.6
Portugal 265 110.7 99.2 99.9
Slovakia 191 91.4 90.6 99.9
Spain 1072 498.1 98.5 99.9
Sweden 774 67.6 93.9 98.8
UK 1107 628.0 83.3 97.0
Total 10056 5256.6 93.1 98.7
Total EU ETS 12122 6321.3 77.2 82.0
Having identied the subset of rms directly aected by the EU ETS, we can now
look separately at the EU ETS and non-EU ETS trends in low-carbon patenting. Figure
3 shows that the share of low-carbon patents was roughly the same among EU ETS and
non-EU ETS rms in the 5 years before the EU ETS launched. Economic theory then
predicts that environmental regulations would produce greater incentives to develop new
technologies for a regulated rm than for an unregulated rm (Milliman and Prince,
1989; Fischer et al., 2003), because the latter is not discharging costly emissions itself
and therefore receives no additional benet reducing its own emissions. After 2005, the
share of low-carbon patents among EU ETS rms looks to have risen faster than among
non-EU ETS rms.14 The dierence does not become apparent until the start of the
13See appendix A for more details on how the link between rm data and regulatory data was
constructed.
14One might be concerned that the surge in patenting activity by EU ETS rms compared to non-EU
ETS companies might have been accompanied by a concurrent drop in the relative average quality of
inventions patented by EU ETS companies. However, the average number of citations received by low-
carbon patents led by EU ETS companies since 2005 does not signicantly dier from those led by
non-EU ETS companies. Similarly, the size of low-carbon patent families is the same for EU ETS and
non-EU ETS companies.
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second trading phase in 2008, which was widely expected to constrain emissions more
tightly than Phase 1 had done. Could the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting, after
all, be a consequence of the EU ETS?
Figure 3: Comparing the share of low-carbon patents (1978{2009)
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Let us naively suppose for a moment that the dierences visible in gure 3 are entirely
due to the EU ETS. This permits us to calculate a simple estimate of the impact of the
EU ETS on low-carbon patenting. Since 2005 EU ETS rms have led 2'189 climate
related patents, compared to 972 patents in the 5 preceding years (an increase of 125%).
Non-EU ETS rms led 19'841 and 12'037 patents protecting low-carbon technologies in
the corresponding periods (an increase of 65%). Low-carbon patenting grew at similar
rates among EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms in the pre-EU ETS period. If we then
were to assume that the number of low-carbon patents led by EU ETS rms, had they
not been regulated, would have grown at the same rate experienced by non-EU ETS
rms, we can calculate a naive estimate of how many low-carbon patents the EU ETS
has added so far: 2'189 - 1.65  972 = 585.2. If 585.2 of the low-carbon patents led at
the EPO in 2005{2009 were additional, this amounts to a 2.6% increase in the number of
low-carbon patents at the EPO compared to what we expect it would have been without
the EU ETS.
This is clearly a very naive estimate. It assumes that the patenting of non-EU ETS
rms provides an accurate counterfactual estimate of how EU ETS companies would
have behaved had they not become regulated. This assumption may be problematic in
case non-EU ETS rms are also responding to the new regulations. A more pressing
concern, though, is that the two groups of rms appear to be very dierent even before
the EU ETS. Just looking at the patenting of these two groups reveals that while only 1
13
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in about 5'500 rms is EU ETS regulated, they account for roughly 1 in 12 low-carbon
patents led in the 5 years before the EU ETS launched. Clearly, EU ETS companies
do not appear to be representative of the population of rms as a whole. One could
quite easily imagine, then, that some unobserved change or shock (other than the EU
ETS) would have had systematically dierent impacts on these two sets of rms. The
naive calculation above cannot isolate the impact of EU ETS in such a case. To begin
to address this shortcoming, it is better to restrict our view to a subset of companies
that are more similar on pre-2005 characteristics. For such a group of rms, it would be
more dicult to imagine post-2005 changes (apart from the EU ETS) that would have
systematically dierent impacts on the patenting activities of EU ETS and non-EU ETS
rms. Rather than comparing all EU ETS rms with all unregulated rms, this more
restricted comparison is likely to yield a better estimate of the impact of the EU ETS.
Let us now turn, therefore, to the task of constructing such a comparison.
4 The direct impact of the EU ETS
4.1 Matching
We face a dicult identication problem. Looking at changes over time is not sucient
to identify the impact of the EU ETS because it is not possible to adequately control for
things like oil price uctuations and changes in macroeconomic conditions. Comparing
EU ETS rms with non-EU ETS rms at a given time allows us to better control for
these time-variant factors. On the other hand, as we have discovered, the typical EU
ETS rm appears very dierent from the typical unregulated rm even before the EU
ETS launched in 2005. This comparison may therefore wrongly attribute some low-
carbon patents to the EU ETS that are really the result of other systematic dierences
between EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms.
Comparing the changes over time for two groups of rms that are more similar prior
to 2005 would make it more dicult to explain away any dierence in outcomes by
factors other than the EU ETS. Ideally one would like to match each EU ETS rm with
a group of non-EU ETS rms with similar resources available and facing similar demand
conditions, regulations (other than the EU ETS), input prices, etc. In this section we
perform just such a matching exercise. As we restrict ourselves to more closely matched
rms there will inevitably be a number of EU ETS companies for which no good match
can be found. What is lost in sample size, however, is regained in terms of accuracy and
robustness (see, for instance, Dehejia and Wahba, 1999).
14
Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre
Along with patent portfolios, our data set contains information on the country and
economic sector in which rms operate,15 as well as other rm-level information such as
turnover and employment. Using this data, we have tried to assign to each of the 5'568
EU ETS rms a group of similar but unregulated rms (setting aside all companies with
ownership ties to EU ETS rms, see appendix A). Though, this has not always been
possible, for two main reasons. Firstly, the records of turnover become less and less
complete further back in time. In fact, we only have pre-2005 records on the turnover
for 3'564 out of the 5'568 EU ETS rms. Secondly, though EU ETS regulations were
applied at the installation level rather than directly to the rm, one might expect two
very similar rms to receive the same regulatory treatment more than occasionally.
Dierent regulatory fates are possible if, say, an EU ETS rm operates an installation
just large enough to be covered by EU ETS regulations, while the matched control
operates one or more installations just below the threshold. But even though we have
a very large pool of rms to start with, sometimes there will be no such comparators
available within the same country and sector. Due to lack of suitable comparators, the
sample of EU ETS rms is further reduced to 3'428. We return to the omitted rms
below in section 4.3, to consider the possible consequences of dropping them from our
sample.
For each of the 3'428 matched EU ETS rms we have found at least one unregulated
rm that operates in the same country and economic sector. This means that they
are likely exposed to much the same business and regulatory environment, input prices,
country and sector specic shocks and trends. The rms are also matched to have
similar pre-2005 turnover, patenting records, and age, since their available resources and
capacity for R&D and patenting are likely important determinants of a rm's response
to the EU ETS.16 The resulting matched sample consists of 3'428 EU ETS rms and
4'373 non-EU ETS rms.
Figure 4 compares the empirical distributions of EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms
in our matched sample on a few key variables used to construct the match. EU ETS
regulated rms have slightly greater pre-EU ETS turnover on average, and led slightly
more patents. However, as can be seen in table 2, we reject the hypotheses that the
empirical distributions dier between the EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms.
Because rms look similar within each match, the rms' pre-2005 observable charac-
15Economic sectors are dened at the 3-digit level for the NACE Rev. 2 industry classication. A
few examples of these sector denitions will illustrate how narrowly sectors are dened: \electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution", \steam and air conditioning supply", \manufacture of glass
and glass products", \manufacture of plastic products", \manufacture of rubber products".
16See appendix B or technical details about how the matching was implemented.
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Figure 4: Comparison of matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms
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Panel (a) displays the empirical quantile-quantile (e-QQ) plot for average turnover in the 4 years before the EU
ETS (2001{2004). Each dot gives the value for one EU ETS rm and the average for a group of matched non-EU
ETS rms, shown on logarithmic scales. 2001 is the rst year for which turnover is recorded in our data set for
any rm. Panels (b) and (c) show the e-QQ plots for the total number of patents and the number low-carbon
patents led 2000{2004, respectively, once again shown on logarithmic scales.
teristics do not help us predict (better than chance) which rm in each matched group
would become regulated after 2005 and which rm in each group would le more low-
carbon patents. Conditional on pre-EU ETS observable characteristics, the assignment
of rms to the EU ETS appears random. In a naive sense, we have recovered the iden-
tifying conditions present in a randomized experiment (though we subject this claim to
further scrutiny below).
4.2 Results
For each rm we measure the change in the number of low-carbon patents from 2000{2004
to 2005{2009. This means that, even after matching, we take account of any additional
time invariant rm-level heterogeneity. The outcomes of the matched control rms are
then subtracted from the outcomes of the EU ETS rms to obtain the dierence-in-
dierences. A striking feature of the patent counts used to calculate these dierence-
in-dierences is the large number of zeros. It is a very common feature of patent data
that most rms do not le any patents at all, and this arises from a similar censoring
problem that usually motivates the use of the Tobit estimator. We can imagine there
being a latent variable that can take any value, but we can only observe numbers of zero
or greater.
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Table 2: Equivalence tests for matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms
Median dierence between Equivalence Critical equivalence
EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms range range (5% sign. lev.)
Turnover (in Mil. Euro) 1.60  523.39  13.25
Patents 0  9.30  1.99
Low-carbon patents 0  0.25  1.99
Year of incorporation 0  5.97  0.49
Any pre-2005 patents (binary) Exactly matched { {
Economic sector Exactly matched { {
Country Exactly matched { {
The rst column from the left reports the median dierence between EU ETS rms and non-EU ETS rms in
our sample for the key matching variables. Apart from those variables shown in gure 4, matched on the year of
incorporation interacted with other variables, since turnover and cumulative patent lings mean dierent things
for an old and new rms. We have also matched exactly for whether (1) or not (0) a rm led any patents
before 2005, for country of operation, and for economic sector (dened at the 3-digit level for NACE Rev. 2).
The empirical distributions of EU ETS and non-EU ETS characteristics are judged to be substantively equivalent
if the location shift parameter (as dened for Wilcoxon's signed-rank test) lies within the `equivalence range'
reported in the second column. We follow the convention of letting this range be  0.2 standard deviations of the
distribution of the pooled sample (Cochran and Rubin, 1973; Ho and Imai, 2006). Using Wilcoxon's signed-rank
test, we are just unable reject at the 5% signicance level the hypothesis that the location shift parameter lies
within the the `critical equivalence range' reported in the nal column. (The signed-rank test has been adjusted
to account for the fact that our variables are censored at zero, using a method outlined by Rosenbaum (2009, ch.
2). More details in section 4 below.) As can be seen by the fact that the range in the third column is contained
within that in the second column, we can reject the hypotheses of substantive dierences for all variables, except
for low-carbon patents. This last failure to reject is because of the small number of rms that led any low-carbon
patents prior to 2005, as is evidenced by the fact that the same test also fails to reject the hypothesis that the
dierence is zero. Standard t-tests for dierences in means reject the hypotheses of substantive dierences for all
variables (not reported).
To implement Tobit estimator in our case, though, we would have to explicitly model
the propensity of rms to le at least one patent. This is by no means a straightforward
exercise, and getting the model wrong carries with it the risk of introducing new biases.
The analogous maximum likelihood estimator will likewise generally be inconsistent, es-
pecially when applied to panel data (Chay and Powell, 2001). Instead, we can account
for the censoring at zero using a Tobit-modied empirical-likelihood estimator, as out-
lined by Rosenbaum (2009, ch. 2). The idea is as follows. We observe the low-carbon
patents led by EU ETS rms and non-EU ETS rms. In estimating a treatment eect,
we would normally search for a number that, if subtracted from each of the observations
in one of our two samples, would as nearly as possible equate the distributions of the two
samples (using some metric of similarity). The problem, of course, is that this assumes
a constant treatment eect that applies even to rms with zero patents. Instead, we can
adjust our observed dierence-in-dierences in a way that takes the censoring into ac-
count, and then re-calculate our similarity measure. Each of the dierence-in-dierences,
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, is adjusted according to the formula:
 =
(
max((Tt   Tt 1)  ; Tt 1)  (Ct   Ct 1) if   0
(Tt   Tt 1) max((Ct   Ct 1) + ; Ct 1) otherwise
where Tt and Tt 1 are the numbers of low-carbon patents led by an EU ETS rm in
the treatment period t (2005{2009) and the pre-treatment period t   1 (2000{2004),
respectively. Ct and Ct 1, are the corresponding numbers for the matched non-EU ETS
rms, and  is the treatment eect. The point estimate of the treatment eect is then
the value of  for which the similarity measure is maximized, and the (1 )% condence
interval is the set of values of  for which we cannot reject the alternative of dierence
at the % level of signicance. We implement this estimator using as our similarity
measure the p-value calculated from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. This provides a
non-parametric alternative to the Tobit estimator.
We estimate a treatment eect of  = 2 additional low-carbon patents for our EU
ETS rms, with a 95% condence interval of (1; 5). The matched EU ETS rms led
a total of 316 low-carbon patents in the period 2005-2009. Subtracting 2 low-carbon
patents from each of our matched EU ETS rms (and accounting for censoring at zero)
tells us that these rms together would have led 232 low-carbon patents in the absence
of EU ETS regulations. Our estimated treatment eect therefore implies that EU ETS
has prompted 84 (53; 129) additional low-carbon patents amongst our sample of EU ETS
rms, or an increase of 36.2% (20.2%, 69.0%) compared to what we expect would have
happened in the absence of the EU ETS. Because these rms only account for a small
portion of all patents, however, this remarkable impact translates into an increase of low-
carbon patenting at the EPO of only 0.38% (0.24%, 0.58%) compared to what we expect
it would have been in the absence of the EU ETS. If we think our estimate applies to all
of the 5'568 EU ETS rms, we can use their patenting records to calculate that, once we
account for censoring at zero, the EU ETS is responsible for 188 (114; 319) additional
low-carbon patents. This amounts to a 8.1% (4.7%, 14.5%) increase in their low-carbon
patenting, or a 0.85% (0.51%, 1.45%) increase in the total number of low-carbon patents
led at the EPO in 2005{2009 compared to the counterfactual. The rst thing to note
about these numbers is that they are substantially smaller than what was suggested by
our naive calculations above (585.2 additional low-carbon patents, or a 2.6% increase
in low-carbon patents at the EPO, see table 3). Second, because these numbers are so
small relative to the totals, it is likely we would not have recognized the impact to be
anything dierent from zero, had we been studying patent counts at a more aggregated
level.
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To address the issue of the direction of technological change, we must compare this
with the impact on patenting for other technologies. Environmental regulations like the
EU ETS increase the cost of production and can in principle encourage patenting for any
technology that reduces it, be it a low-carbon technology or not. The induced innovation
hypothesis holds that a policy like the EU ETS would have a disproportionate impact on
low-carbon technologies, but this is an essentially empirical matter. There is a related
concern, also, that the increase in low-carbon innovation will actually displace, or crowd
out, development of other technologies (Popp and Newell, 2012). We can address these
questions using the same matched sample and estimator described above. We estimate
that the EU ETS has added on average 1 other patent (1; 1:99). This translates into
305 (305; 512:9) additional patents for other technologies, which represents an increase
of 1.9% (1.9%, 3.2%) in their patent lings for non-low-carbon technologies, or a 0.041%
(0.041%, 0.068%) increase in patenting for other technologies at the EPO. Comparing
these numbers with the estimates from the previous paragraph, we see that the EU ETS
has had a disproportionate impact on patenting for low-carbon technologies: 36.2% vs.
1.9% (dierence is signicant at 5% level). Put another way, the Scheme has nearly
had a 20 times greater impact on low-carbon patenting, but it has not crowded out
patenting for other technologies. If we think our estimate applies to all of the 5'568
EU ETS rms, the EU ETS would be responsible for 554 (554; 963:86) additional other
patents, which amounts to a 0.77% (0.77%, 1.34%) increase in their other patenting, or
a 0.074% (0.074%, 0.13%) increase in the total number of other patents led at the EPO
in 2005{2009.
Our results are summarised for convenience in table 3, along with comparable naive
estimates for the full sample of EU ETS rms (calculated as in section 3). The naive es-
timates display the same general pattern as our matching estimates, showing increases in
patenting for both low-carbon and other technologies, but with a pronounced direction.
When compared to our matching estimates, however, the naive calculations are revealed
to substantially overestimate the impact of the EU ETS. The matching estimates still
suggest the EU ETS has had a positive and notable impact on low-carbon patenting
among EU ETS rms, though relative to the overall pace of low-carbon technologi-
cal development, the impact appears to have been much smaller, boosting low-carbon
patenting by only a fraction of a percent. On the one hand, our ndings contradict
early prognostications that over-allocation of emissions permits in the EU ETS would
completely undermine the incentives for low-carbon innovation. On the other hand, even
a quite remarkable response among EU ETS rms|whether 36.2% among matched EU
ETS rms or 8.1% among the full sample|translates into rather small impact from an
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Table 3: Summary of results
Matching estimates Naive estimates
Matched sample Full sample Full sample
Additional low-carbon patents 84 188 585.2
(53, 129) (114, 319)
As % increase 36.2 8.1 36.5
(20.2, 69.0) (4.7, 14.5)
As % increase of EPO 0.38 0.85 2.6
(0.24, 0.58) (0.51, 1.45)
Additional other patents 305 554 9072.8
(305, 512.9) (554, 963.86)
As % increase 1.9 0.77 16.0
(1.9, 3.2) (0.77, 1.34)
As % increase of EPO 0.041 0.074 1.2
(0.041, 0.068) (0.074, 0.13)
Point estimates, along with 95% condence intervals in brackets where applicable. The matched sample estimates
consider the impact only for the 3'426 matched EU ETS rms, while full sample estimates consider the impact
for all 5'568 EU ETS rms in our data set. The matching estimates are calculated using our point estimates
of  obtained for the matched sample of 3'426 EU ETS rms and 4'373 non-EU ETS rms. Naive estimates
are included for comparison. They have been calculated using the full set of 30 million non-EU ETS rms to
construct a counterfactual, as in section 3.
economy-wide perspective, less than a 1% increase at the EPO. Putting it another way,
of the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting seen in gure 1, roughly 2% can be at-
tributed to the EU ETS.17 It is worth noting that this apparently small impact relative
to the overall pace of technological change is not simply an arithmetical artifact of the
small number of EU ETS rms, however, as is demonstrated by the fact that the naive
estimator is more than three times higher.
Before settling on an interpretation of our estimates, however, we must ask whether
they are really best explained by the EU ETS having had a very small impact? Perhaps
these small numbers should instead caution us that we may have underestimated the
impact? Let us therefore investigate challenges to the internal and external validity of
our results.
4.3 Robustness tests
Is our conclusion driven by an omitted variable? The primary challenge for any
matching study is to justify the assumption that rms that appear similar are similar in
unmeasured dimensions as well|often called `selection on observables'. In a randomized
17The number of low-carbon patents led at the EPO increased by 9054 from the period 2000-2004
to 2005-2009. The 188 additional low-carbon patents we have attributed to the EU ETS correspond
to 2% of this increase. Even under the more generous framing that the upward trend from 2000-2004
would have continued unabated in 2005-2009, the post-2005 `surge' was only 4725.5 low-carbon patents,
of which the 188 additional low-carbon patents would amount to barely 4%.
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experiment one can rely on the law of large numbers to achieve similarity between a
treated and control group on both observed and unobserved characteristics. Matching,
on the other hand, achieves an observed similarity by construction, so similarity on
matched characteristics cannot be read to as evidence that the treated and control rms
are also similar on unobserved characteristics.
A simple test of whether matching has achieved balance on unobserved variables is
to look at a variable that was not used to construct the matches. We have one such
variable in our data set: the number of employees. As gure 5 and table 4 show, the
empirical distributions of number of employees of the EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms
are very similar, and we can reject the hypothesis that they are materially dierent.
We can therefore have some condence that matching has indeed recovered the central
identifying condition of a randomized experiment.
Figure 5: Comparison of matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms on `unobserved' variable
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Table 4: Equivalence test for matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms on `unobserved' variable
Median dierence between Equivalence Critical equivalence
EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms range range (5% sign. lev.)
Employees 25  904.07  106.75
See caption of table 2 for details on how to read this table.
This test, though reassuring, is perhaps too simplistic. Other unobserved dierences
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between regulated and unregulated rms might still bias our ndings. What kind of an
omitted variable could in principle undermine condence in our estimate?
Imagine that we have an omitted binary variable that tells us whether a rm would be
covered by a complementary carbon policy. If this variable is negatively correlated with
EU ETS regulations and positively correlated with increases in low-carbon patenting (or
vice versa), this omission would cause us to underestimate the impact of the EU ETS.
Using the model for sensitivity analysis developed by Rosenbaum (1987) and Rosenbaum
and Silber (2009), we can infer precisely how large the omitted variable bias would have
to be in order to undermine condence in our estimate relative to some larger alternative.
In order for our 3'428 matched EU ETS rms to have boosted the number of low-
carbon patents led at the EPO by 5%, say, they would have to have led 1062 additional
low-carbon patents. Since they did not le this many low-carbon patents in 2005{2009
in total, we can comfortably rule out that the EU ETS would have had such a large
treatment eect even if all of the patents were additional. To have boosted low-carbon
patents by just 1%, 223 of their low-carbon patents would have to have been additional.
This translates back into a treatment eect of  = 20:4|more than 10 times higher than
our original estimate. In order to increase our point estimate beyond this level, we would
have to postulate an omitted variable that, if observed before 2005, would successfully
predict more than 83 times out of a 100 (a) which rm in our matched pairs escapes
EU ETS regulations and (b) which rm in our matched pairs would most increase their
low-carbon patenting. Even if the omitted variable predicted (a) almost perfectly, it
would still have to predict (b) 73 times out of 100. For the milder threshold of just
being unable to reject the hypothesis that the the treatment eect is 20:4, we would
still have to postulate an omitted variable that makes these prediction successfully more
than 70 times out of 100.18 We have estimated above that our sample of matched EU
ETS rms account for only a 0.38% increase in low-carbon patenting at the EPO. If one
nds an example of a complementary policy that was implemented in such a systematic
fashion across the EU and caused such a predictable boost in the low-carbon patenting,
we would have to concede that they may have boosted low-carbon patenting by as much
as 1%. Even then, it is not obvious that this would seriously challenge the conclusion
that the EU ETS has had but a limited direct impact on low-carbon patenting overall.
Another omitted variable candidate|whether a rm had high or low carbon emis-
sions prior to 2005|is generally expected to be positively correlated with both a rm's
18In Rosenbaum's notation, it is just possible that the estimated treatment eect is 20:4 for a sensitivity
parameter of   = 2:65, and we are just unable to reject this treatment eect at the 5% signicance level
for   = 1:4. This can be decomposed into the biases present in treatment assignment and outcomes
using propositions in Rosenbaum and Silber (2009).
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chances of becoming regulated and with their chances of increasing their low-carbon
patenting. The omission of a variable with these properties would imply we have over-
estimated the impact of the EU ETS above. To reduce our point estimate to zero, we
would need to postulate an omitted variable that predicts more than 81 times out of 100
(a) which rm in our matched pairs became EU ETS regulated and (b) which rm in our
matched pairs would most increase their low-carbon patenting. It would need to make
these predictions successfully more than 71 times out of 100 to make us just unable to
reject at the 5% level the hypothesis that the treatment eect is really zero.19
In sum, matching has achieved balance on at least one `unobserved' characteristic,
which might suggest it has balanced other unobserved variables as well, like a truly
randomized experiment would have. Even if this is not the case, though, it appears our
estimate of the low-carbon treatment eect is reasonably robust to both negative and
positive omitted variable biases. If anything, the fact that the estimate is ever-so-slightly
more sensitive to a positive bias would tend to reinforce our earlier conclusion that the
EU ETS has had but a small direct impact on low-carbon patenting.
Are the estimates valid beyond our sample? A more serious challenge to our
conclusion, perhaps, is to justify extrapolating from our sample of 3'428 EU ETS rms
to all EU ETS rms. This type of calculation might lead us to underestimate the impact
of the EU ETS if the rms omitted from estimation have had a systematically stronger
reaction compared to those rms in our sample. This is a question of selection bias.
We can address this concern in three ways: (1) increasing the sample size, (2) cal-
culating an upper bound for our estimates, and (3) calculating a lower bound for the
out-of-sample response necessary to qualitatively aect our conclusions. Firstly, because
turnover gures become more widely available in 2005, we are able to increase sample
size if we allow ourselves to use 2005 turnover gures to construct the matches. This is
not generally desirable, because the EU ETS might have aected 2005 turnover, which in
turn had some eect on low-carbon patenting. If this is the case, the matching estimate
using 2005 turnover would be biased because it omits this channel. However, because
using 2005 turnover gives us access to a greater number of EU ETS and non-EU ETS
rms, it may still provide a reasonable test of whether our ndings apply to the EU ETS
more broadly.
Matching using 2005 turnover gures allows us to successfully match an additional
19In Rosenbaum's notation, it is just possible that the estimated treatment eect is 0 for a sensitivity
parameter of   = 2:34, and we are just unable to reject this treatment eect at the 5% signicance level
for   = 1:45.
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427 EU ETS rms, producing 3'855 matched groups in total. The point estimates for this
sample are 2:75 (1; 5:99) for low-carbon patents and 1 (1; 1:99) for other patents. The
point estimate for the impact on low-carbon patents is slightly larger than before (but
not signicantly dierent), but the same for other patents. These estimates translate into
92:25 (49; 133:89) additional low-carbon patents and 318 (318; 530:85) additional other
patents across our 3'855 EU ETS rms. In percentage terms they imply a somewhat
smaller patenting response than before: increases of 18.9 (9.2, 30.0) and 2.4 (2.4, 4.2)
respectively. This amounts to a 0.42% (0.22, 0.60) increase in low-carbon patenting
at the EPO and a 0.042 (0.042, 0.071) increase in patent lings for other technologies,
which is virtually identical to our original estimates. The typical matched rm still looks
much the same, which is what one would expect if we were simply nding more rms
around the same EU ETS thresholds. The EU ETS rms in our original matched sample
therefore appear to be representative of a larger portion of the EU ETS. On the other
hand, it also means that this re-match does not so much help address concerns that
the EU ETS is aecting low-carbon patenting among the atypical companies for which
suitable unregulated matches could not be found the rst time around.
It is, nevertheless, possible to bound the eect that these atypical rms can have on
the impact estimates. Suppose we were able to perfectly match every one of the 2'140 EU
ETS rms we were forced to omit. Suppose further that the hypothetically matched non-
EU ETS rms have not led any patents since 2005, a strict lower bound. Because we
observe the low-carbon patenting of the EU ETS rms, these two assumptions allow us to
calculate the upper bound dierence-in-dierences for each of these 2'140 EU ETS rms.
Pooling them with the 3'428 previously dierence-in-dierences, we can then estimate
the upper bound of the treatment eect.20 This procedure produces point estimates of 13
(4; 43:99) for low-carbon and 6 (4; 10:99) for other patents. These high point estimates
are driven in large part by a small number of prolic patenters that were previously
omitted, but are now matched to hypothetical non-EU ETS rms with zero patents
after 2005. Subtracting a large number of patents from each rm and accounting for
censoring at zero, therefore, does not add as many patents as the higher point estimates
perhaps might suggest. The new estimates translate into 524 (275; 952:9) additional low-
carbon patents and 2093 (1582; 3176:95) additional other patents, or increases of 26.7%
(12.4%, 62.2%) and 3% (2.3%, 4.7%) respectively. While there is still a clear direction
to induced technological change, it is less pronounced than for our original estimates. In
20This bound is analogous to the sharp bounds derived by Manski (2007, ch. 2) for situations with
missing data. The bound is sharp in the sense that it does not impose any restrictions on the process
that leads to `missingness'.
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comparison with the total numbers of patents that would otherwise have been led at
the EPO in each category in this period, the additional patents represent a 2.4% (1.2%,
4.5%) increase in low-carbon patenting and a 0.28% (0.21%, 0.42%) increase in patenting
for other technologies. In economic terms, the upper bounds are perhaps slightly more
noteworthy than our original estimates, though we are now very aware of the kind of
extremely favourable and unrealistic assumptions needed to generate results that even
begin to demand attention. And even then, the results are perhaps not so impressive as
to seriously challenge the conclusion that the EU ETS has had a limited direct impact
on low-carbon patenting.
Our third strategy to address concerns about external validity is to calculate what
out-of-sample response would be necessary in order to qualitatively aect our conclusion.
Our sample covers 9'358 out of the 12'122 installations that fell under EU ETS regulation
in 2005 (see table 1). In order for the EU ETS to have boosted low-carbon patenting
by 5%, say, EU ETS rms would together have to have led 1062 additional low-carbon
patents in 2005{2009. Subtracting our best estimate of 188 additional low-carbon patents
for the 5'568 rms operating 9'358 EU ETS installations, this leaves the operators of the
remaining 2'764 installations to have led 874 additional low-carbon patents. To put
it another way, we estimate that the average EU ETS rm in our sample led roughly
0.03 extra low-carbon patents, but even if the remaining 2'764 were operated by as many
rms (another charitable assumption), the EU ETS rms outside our sample would have
to have led 0.32 additional low-carbon patents in the same period. The out-of-sample
response would have to be 10 times greater than the in-sample response. Even if we use
the upper bound estimate (in-sample rms led 524 additional low-carbon patents), the
out-of-sample rms would have to have led 538 extra low-carbon patents, or at least
0.19 per rm, which is still more than twice the upper bound for our in-sample rms
(0.09). These strong responses appear especially unlikely in light of the fact that most of
the out-of-sample rms operate in countries with lower patenting propensities (Cyprus,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and Slovenia).
It seems, therefore, that none of the strategies to address concerns about external
validity|increasing sample size, computing upper bounds, and calculating necessary
out-of-sample responses|seriously challenge our earlier conclusion. The EU ETS ap-
pears to have had a very limited direct impact on low-carbon technological change.
Other robustness tests. Above we have tried to address the most pertinent chal-
lenges to our interpretation of the results, but one can imagine still other explanations
for why the direct impact of the EU ETS appears to have been so small. We have tried
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to test several of these:
 Are matched non-EU ETS rms also responding to EU ETS? If so, rms less
exposed to the EU ETS and to direct competition with EU ETS rms would
perhaps be expected to respond less. We re-match our EU ETS rms to similar
rms in Norway, Switzerland, Bulgaria, and Romania (4 countries that did not
launch the EU ETS in 2005, and two of which have remained outside). We also
re-matched our EU ETS rms to similar US rms. Neither comparison returns
an estimate of the treatment eect signicantly dierent from that reported above
(see appendix D for further details).
 Did the main patenting response occur after the Directive was adopted in 2003,
but before the EU ETS launched in 2005? Some authors have highlighted the
possibility that rms patent in anticipation of new regulations (Dekker et al.,
2012). To address this concern, we re-matched our EU ETS rms using 2003 as
the treatment year instead of 2005. The treatment eect for the period 2003{
2004 actually indicates that prospective EU ETS rms would actually have led
1.75 additional low-carbon patents if not for the EU ETS (again, zero adjusted),
though the number is not signicantly dierent from zero. In other words, there
is no signicant dierence in the patenting activities of EU ETS and non-EU ETS
rms in this period.
 Is the result an artifact of how we measure low-carbon patents? To address this,
we looked at using an expanded denition of low-carbon patents. This does not
materially aect our conclusions, however. Moreover, it seems that our results
cannot be accounted for by a failure to adjust for the quality of patents either.
The number of citations for patents held by EU ETS rms do not increase more
than for non-EU ETS rms (see appendix D for more details).
 Is there some other hidden bias? Perhaps we are only picking up the low-carbon
technology component of a broader trend toward environmental technologies going
on among our EU ETS rms. We look at the number of patents led by matched
EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms protecting other `pollution control technologies',
as dened by Popp (2006). Since these technologies do not help mitigate emissions
covered under the EU ETS, we would not expect the EU ETS to have had any im-
pact. A hidden bias in our study design, perhaps some unknown omitted variable,
would manifest itself as nding a treatment eect here that is signicantly dierent
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from zero. Our estimated treatment eect is  = 0:75, but it is not signicantly
dierent from zero.21
It appears, then, that EU ETS has had a positive and notable impact on low-carbon
patenting among EU ETS rms. It has spurred development of low-carbon technologies
without crowding out innovation for other technologies. Since EU ETS rms account
for only a small proportion of low-carbon patents, however, the impact on EU ETS
regulated rms is negligible on a European scale. None of the above challenges seems to
oer a compelling alternative explanation to this interpretation of the results.22
If we accept, then, that the impact of the EU ETS on regulated rms does not
account for the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting seen in gure 1, might the EU
ETS still be indirectly responsible? Has it encouraged third parties to develop low-
carbon technologies in the hope of selling or licensing them to newly regulated EU ETS
rms? We investigate this question next.
5 The indirect impact of the EU ETS
The preceding analysis strongly suggests that the direct impact of the EU ETS has not
been sucient to account for the apparent surge in low-carbon patenting since 2005.
Could the impact of the EU ETS instead have been largely indirect, spurring third
parties to develop new low-carbon technologies?
There are three major reasons why we would expect the indirect impact to be com-
paratively small. Firstly, economic theory predicts that environmental regulations would
produce greater incentives to develop new technologies for directly regulated rm than
for third parties (Milliman and Prince, 1989; Fischer et al., 2003). The asymmetry arises
because the latter group is not discharging costly emissions themselves and receive no
additional benet reducing its own emissions. To the extent that the EU ETS is encour-
aging low-carbon technological change, therefore, economic theory predicts this response
to be strongest among EU ETS rms.
21Roughly 20% of EPO patents classied as one of Popp's pollution control technologies also fall into
the low-carbon category. Excluding these, however, does not substantively aect the outcome.
22One must be careful also because some of the tests we have used to investigate these alternative
explanations, though addressing one potential source of bias, may introduce new biases of their own
(e.g. using 2005 turnover gures). The point here, however, is that to replicate our results each time,
the new bias would have to be of the same sign and magnitude as the hypothesized bias in the original
match. This explanation becomes increasingly unlikely with each new test, and the explanation that our
estimate is unbiased appears more likely by comparison.
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Secondly, EU ETS rms have led over 120'000 patents with the EPO since 2000,
circa 2.5% of which protect low-carbon technologies. These are clearly rms with above
average innovation capabilities. To argue that the bulk of the response to the EU ETS
comes from third-party technology providers amounts to saying that these EU ETS
rms with well-developed low-carbon innovation capabilities are responding mostly by
purchasing technologies from others, rather than developing the technologies in-house to
suit their own specic needs.
Thirdly, the EU ETS rms in our sample are very likely technology providers them-
selves. As highlighted in the previous paragraph, EU ETS rms do develop new tech-
nologies themselves, including low-carbon technologies. While some rms may innovate
in the hope of meeting new demand from EU ETS rms, others might expect greater
opportunities to purchase the technologies developed by EU ETS rms. The indirect
impact of the EU ETS is the net of these two responses.
These three reasons suggest that the indirect impact of the EU ETS would be com-
paratively small, but all claims about the indirect eect need to be met with the same
level of skepticism as any other empirical hypothesis. It is a very dicult task to cleanly
estimate the indirect impact of the EU ETS, not least because of the diculty involved
in identifying rms more likely to either provide new technologies to EU ETS rms or to
which EU ETS rms are more likely to provide new technologies. We can, nevertheless,
make a start.
Consider the set of rms that had led at least one patent jointly with an EU ETS
rm prior to 2005. A joint patent ling records a technological partnership with an
EU ETS rm. One might then expect these rms to be more likely than an average
non-EU ETS to either provide technologies to EU ETS rms once the regulations came
into force, or to demand new technologies from EU ETS rms. They are likely to be
good candidates for studying the indirect impact of the EU ETS. By comparing this
set of rms with other non-EU ETS rms, therefore, we might hope to gain at least
some partial insight as to the net indirect impact of the EU ETS. It is worth noting,
though, that while technology provision is an asymmetric relationship, co-patenting is
of course symmetric. Hence, we cannot separate co-patenters into technology providers
and demanders even if each co-patenter could in principle be classied as one or the
other. Nevertheless, we can provide an indicative estimate of the net indirect impact of
the EU ETS.
From patent records we can identify 11'603 non-EU ETS rms that each led at
least one patent jointly with an EU ETS rm in 1978{2004. Many of these rms are no
longer active or operate in countries not in our data set, which prevents us from matching
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them. Additionally, as before there are many rms for which historical data are missing,
and a few for which we simply cannot nd suitable comparators. Our matched sample
therefore contains 2'784 co-patenters and 19'361 similar rms that had not led a joint
patent with an EU ETS rm prior to 2005.23 Figure 6 and table 5 show the properties
of our matched sample.24
Figure 6: Comparison of matched co-patenters and non-co-patenting rms
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We estimate a treatment eect of  = 0:99 additional low-carbon patents among
our co-patenters, with a 95% condence interval of ( 0:99; 1:99). We cannot say with
condence, therefore, that the EU ETS has had any net impact on the low-carbon
patenting of co-patenters. Even taking the point estimate at face value, it translates
into a mere 47.52 additional low-carbon patents. Although it would represent a quite
dramatic response, on the order of a 32.4% increase compared to what it would have
been without the EU ETS, it would still translate into a negligible increase relative to
the number of low-carbon patents led at the EPO (0.2%). Extrapolating the number
to all 11'603 co-patenters would naturally make it look as if the EU ETS has had a
more impressive indirect impact, but since the estimate does not even stand up to a
conventional signicance test, such an exercise is not likely to be informative.
23Compared to when EU ETS rms were matched earlier, nding a single good comparator here was a
good indicator that there were many good comparators available. We have kept all of these comparators
in our matched sample to reduce the variance of our estimates.
24On average, co-patenters have historically led more patents than EU ETS rms. It is no mystery
why|to be a co-patenters a rm must have led at least one patent prior to 2005, while EU ETS rms
had no such requirement to meet.
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Table 5: Equivalence tests for matched co-patenters and non-co-patenting rms
Median dierence between Equivalence Critical equivalence
EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms range range (5% sign. lev.)
Turnover (in th. Euro) 14.90  304'382.80  1'421.00
Patents 0  7.07  < 0.01
Low-carbon patents 0  0.17  0.99
Year of incorporation 0  5.48  0.50
Any pre-2005 patents (binary) Exactly matched { {
Economic sector Exactly matched { {
Country Exactly matched { {
Employees 1.66  1'613.82  20.66
See caption of table 2 for details on how to read this table. Again, the failure to reject the hypothesis of dierence
for low-carbon patents is a consequence of the small number of rms that led any low-carbon patents prior to
2005. The same test also fails to reject the hypothesis that the dierence is zero. Standard t-tests for dierences
in means reject the hypotheses of substantive dierences for all variables (not reported). For completeness, the
results from the robustness test of checking balance on employees is also included at the bottom of this table.
The picture is not much more encouraging for other technologies either. We estimate
that the EU ETS has on average subtracted 0.745 other patents ( 0:99; 0:01) for co-
patenters. We are just barely able to reject the hypothesis that the eect is actually
zero, but this rejection does not withstand even the slightest challenge to robustness.
Moreover, even if the point estimate were true, it would suggest that the EU ETS has
crowded out patenting for non-low-carbon technologies among co-patenters.
These numbers oer no compelling evidence that the EU ETS has had an indirect
impact on patenting. A patent led jointly with an EU ETS rm is a record of a
technological partnership, be it the case that the co-patenter has provided technologies
to EU ETS rms or vice versa. In either case, one would expect that co-patenters are
more likely than an average non-EU ETS rm to supply new technologies to EU ETS
rms once the EU ETS launched, or to demand new technologies from EU ETS rms.
Yet, taken together, co-patenters appear to behave no dierent to other non-EU ETS
rms. It is of course incredibly dicult to identify potential technology providers and
demanders for the purposes of estimation, so our results should not be over-interpreted.
Nevertheless, our ndings can perhaps be read as a reasonable indication that the EU
ETS has had no net indirect impact on directed technological change. At the very least,
it poses an empirical challenge for those wishing to argue otherwise.
6 Discussion
The EU ETS launched in 2005, amid both promises and pessimism. It has aimed to
encourage the development of low-carbon technologies by putting a price on carbon
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emissions. In this paper we have investigated the Scheme's success in this regard during
the 5 years subsequent to its launch.
A casual look at aggregate patenting suggests there has been an increase in low-
carbon patenting since 2005, but there are several obstacles to isolating the impact of
the EU ETS. Comparing patenting behaviour prior to and after 2005 risks conating
the impact of the EU ETS with other changes, like rapidly rising oil prices. Yet, looking
only at the period after 2005 and comparing EU ETS regulated rms with those that
escaped regulation risks conating the impact of the EU ETS with other systematic
dierences in rm characteristics that might also drive patenting. Employing a matched
dierence-in-dierences study design has permitted us to account for rm-level time-
invariant heterogeneity, and to isolate that part of the change that does not depend on
systematic dierences in rm characteristics.
We nd evidence that the EU ETS has had a strong impact on the patenting be-
haviour of EU ETS regulated rms. Our best estimate for a sample of 3'428 EU ETS
rms implies that the Scheme has increased their low-carbon patenting by 36.2% com-
pared to what we expect would have happened in the absence of the EU ETS. What is
more, our estimates suggest that the Scheme has also encouraged EU ETS rms to in-
creased their patent lings for non-low-carbon technologies by 1.9%. The EU ETS thus
appears to have had a disproportionate impact on patenting for low-carbon technologies,
but it has not crowded out patenting for other technologies.
Extrapolating our point estimates to 5'568 EU ETS rms across 18 countries (and
accounting for censoring at zero), the EU ETS would account for an 8.1% increase in
low-carbon patenting and a 0.77% increase in patenting for other technologies. Because
of the targeted nature of EU ETS regulations, however, these responses translate into a
quite unremarkable nudge on the pace and direction of technological change|a 0.38%
boost to low-carbon patenting at the EPO (0.85% for the full sample), and a meagre
0.041% boost to patenting for other technologies (0.074% for the full sample).
To test whether our focus on EU ETS rms would have blinkered us to the Scheme's
broader eects, we have also attempted to estimate the indirect impact of the EU ETS.
To this end, we have compared non-EU ETS rms with at least one patent jointly led
with an EU ETS rm, with otherwise similar non-EU ETS rms. Although we can only
provide indicative estimates, we nd no compelling evidence that the EU ETS has had
either a net positive or net negative impact on the patent lings of potential technology
providers and demanders.
Our ndings suggest a reinterpretation of the broader empirical literature on envi-
ronmental policy and directed technological change. Several studies of the impacts of
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inclusive standards and energy or pollution taxes nd evidence that the environmental
policy does indeed encourage directed technological change (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996;
Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2002, 2003, 2006; Arimura et al., 2007; Lanoie
et al., 2007). In contrast, studies of previous emissions trading schemes, like the US Acid
Rain Program, at best unearth evidence of very small impacts on directed technological
change (Popp, 2003; Lange and Bellas, 2005). Our results indicate that this discrepancy
may be a consequence, not of weaker innovation incentives provided by emissions trad-
ing instruments, but of the fact that previous studies have used aggregate measures of
innovation while cap-and-trade programs tend to concern a comparatively small number
of rms. The impact on these rms may in fact be quite large, even in the EU ETS
where permits in the initial trading phases were very likely over-allocated. When their
response is compared to the overall pace of technological change, however, the eect
appears negligible. Someone studying the impact of an emissions trading program by
looking at patenting records at a more aggregated level is therefore likely to overlook the
Scheme's strong but targeted eect. Conversely, the impact of more inclusive environ-
mental policies, like standards, energy taxes, and pollution taxes, may be more easily
detected because it is spread across so many rms, even if the change in behaviour
for each rm is quite small. Debates about the relative costs and benets of dierent
environmental policy instruments already consider the impacts on pace and direction
technological change of central importance (Kneese and Schultze, 1975; Pizer and Popp,
2008). Our results, read in combination with the ndings of the broader literature,
suggest that environmental policy instruments may dier also in the distribution of im-
pacts on directed technological change. This could be potentially signicant because of
the positive spill-overs usually associated with innovation. It is an interesting question
for future research, therefore, whether this could change the economic, or indeed the
political calculus of instrument choice for environmental policy.
There are many other questions too that we have not answered in this paper. Our
aim has been to establish what the overall impact of the EU ETS has been on directed
technological change. Some readers, though, might be interested to know more of the
impact in their own country, or perhaps in a particular economic sector. Such questions
are much more dicult to answer with condence. They involve estimating many more
parameters, and there are fewer observations to estimate each one. Future research
may give us a more granular picture of the impact of the EU ETS across countries and
economic sectors. In focusing on the EU ETS, moreover, we also have not identied
what has caused the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting in Europe. It would be
an interesting exploratory exercise to search for the other factors contributing to this
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development (e.g. renewable energy policies). At present, we can establish only that
the EU ETS seems to have played no more than a very limited part. A third set of
questions relate to the innovation incentives attributable to specic features of the EU
ETS. For instance, would we have observed a greater impact if the price of permits had
been higher? Or if the permits had been auctioned instead of allocated for free? It is not
feasible to test these hypotheses at present, given the lack of variation in EU ETS rules
so far. Future changes to the rules may provide opportunities to study these specic
questions.
Our results also have broader policy implications. The EU ETS forms an integral part
of the European Union's roadmap to a low-carbon economy in 2050 (European Commis-
sion, 2011). Policy makers in New Zealand, the United States, Australia, China, Japan,
South Korea, and elsewhere, can also learn from the EU ETS experience. So far, it
appears that emissions reductions in the EU ETS have come largely from operational
rather than technological changes, much like in past emissions trading programs. Emis-
sions reductions have so far come largely from measures like fuel switching, but we know
that such abatement strategies will not be enough to reach the EU's ambitious longer
term targets. New low-carbon technologies are needed. Indeed, our results indicate that
EU ETS regulated rms are cognizant of this fact, and are responding accordingly. Even
so, because the impact of emissions trading appears to be concentrated to a relatively
small group of rms, their response looks to nearly vanish when considered in relation
to the overall pace and direction of technological change. For this reason, the Scheme in
its current form might not be providing the economy-wide incentives necessary to bring
about low-carbon technological change on a larger scale.
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A Data
For 8 of the countries in our sample, the company registration numbers of the installation
operators were obtained directly, either from national emissions trading registries or from
the Community Independent Transactions Log (CITL) (the EU body to which national
registries report). For the remaining 13 countries in our data set that participated in
the 2005 launch of the EU ETS, a combination of exact and approximate text matching
methods were used to establish a link between rm data and regulatory data. This was
complemented by further manual searches, and extensive manual double-checking.
The rm data set allows us to identify majority ownership. Using this information,
we excluded non-EU ETS rms that were owner, sister company, or subsidiary to an EU
ETS rm. This reduces the chance of matching two potentially dependent observations.
B Matching
The matches were constructed using GenMatch() from the R-package Matching. It uses
a genetic search algorithm to search the propensity score space for a specication that
minimizes imbalances on the whole set of covariates (see Sekhon, 2007, for details). We
used variable ratio matching with replacement, so that each EU ETS rm could be
matched to one or more non-EU ETS rms depending on how many similar non-EU
ETS rms could be found.
C Patents
We use the patent codes available at www.oecd.org/environment/innovation. For our
main measure of low-carbon patents we use the EPO patent classes for low-carbon
patents denition, detailed in Veefkind et al. (2012). Table 6, adapted from Veefkind
et al. (2012), lists the main patent classes along with some examples of technologies for
each class:
D Details of other robustness tests
Are matched non-EU ETS rms also responding to EU ETS? The matched
rms that are not regulated by the EU ETS may nevertheless respond to it, either di-
rectly, or indirectly because they engage in competition with EU ETS rms. This would
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Table 6: Climate change mitigation patent categories (EPO's Y02 class)
Patent code Description Example technologies
Y02C 10/00 CO2 capture or storage
Chemical or biological separation, ad- or
absorption, membrane technology,
condensation etc.; subterranean or
submarine storage
Y02C 20/00
Capture or disposal of greenhouse gases
other than CO2
N2O, methane, peruorocarbons,
hydrouorocarbons or sulfur hexauoride
Y02E 10/00
Energy generation through renewable
energy sources
Geothermal, hydro, oceanic, solar
(photovoltaic and thermal), wind
Y02E 20/00
Combustion technologies with mitigation
potential
Combined Heat and Power (CHP),
Combined Cycle Power Plant (CCPP),
Integrated Gasication Combined Cycle
(IGCC), synair, oxyfuel combustion, cold
ame, etc.
Y02E 30/00 Energy generation of nuclear origin Fusion and ssion
Y02E 40/00
Technologies for ecient electrical power
generation, transmission or distribution
Reactive power compensation, ecient
operation of power networks, etc.
Y02E 50/00
Technologies for the production of fuel of
non-fossil origin
Biofuels, from waste
Y02E 60/00
Technologies with potential or indirect
contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions mitigation
Energy storage (batteries, ultracapacitors,
ywheels.), hydrogen technology, fuel
cells, etc.
Y02E 70/00
Other energy conversion or management
systems reducing GHG emissions
Synergies among renewable energies, fuel
cells and energy storage
bias our estimates. If very similar unregulated rms are responding by innovating more,
a comparison of EU ETS rms and matched non-EU ETS rms will under-estimate the
impact of the EU ETS. If very similar unregulated rms are responding by innovating
less, this comparison will over-estimate the impact of the EU ETS. To examine these
possibilities we have re-matched our EU ETS rms to companies operating in European
countries that did not participate in the 2005 launch of the EU ETS (Norway, Switzer-
land, Romania, and Bulgaria), and then separately to US companies. These comparisons
are less likely to suer from this kind of bias, because the matched non-EU ETS rms
are less exposed to the market created by the EU ETS and less likely to be directly
engaged in competition with EU ETS companies.25
Table 7 reports the estimated treatment eects for both the European and US re-
matched samples, along with our original estimates for comparison. The re-matched
point estimates are smaller than our original estimate (and both insignicantly dierent
from zero), which would tend to indicate that very similar unregulated rms in EU ETS
countries perhaps are innovating less than they would have without the EU ETS. Our
original estimate, then, may if anything have overestimated the impact of the EU ETS.
25While this comparison helps address a potential bias introduced by non-EU ETS rms responding
to the EU ETS, it is not able to control for between-country dierences.
41
Table 7: Treatment eect estimates using `distant' matches
Norway, Switzerland, 1
Romania, and Bulgaria (0, 1.99)
USA -1
(-1.99, 0.99)
Original estimate 2
(1, 5)
Due to between-country dierences, however, which these re-matched estimates cannot
control for, one should exercise caution in recommending such an interpretation. Neither
of the re-matched estimates dier signicantly from our original estimate, and as such
do not seem to oer a substantive challenge to our ndings.
Is the result an artifact of how we measure low-carbon patents? It is possible
that our nding is an artifact of our particular measure of low-carbon technological
change. If we compare our matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS rms using expanded
denition of \low-carbon technologies", the result does not appear to change materially
(see table D). Our original estimate was that the EU ETS accounts for a 36.2% increase
in low-carbon patenting among matched EU ETS rms, a 8.1% increase across our full
sample of EU ETS rms, and no more than a 1% increase across our study area. The
new treatment eect estimates suggest the EU ETS may have increased low-carbon
patenting among matched EU ETS rms by 32.4%, a 7.1% increase across our full
sample, and no more than a 1% increase across our study area. The new numbers are
well within our original condence intervals, and do not appear to present a challenge
for our interpretation of the results. Our ndings therefore appear robust to how the
outcome is dened.
Table 8: Estimates with dierent denitions of \low-carbon technologies"
Additional low-carbon patents
Matched sample Full sample
As % increase As % increase of EPO As % increase As % increase of EPO
Extended denition 32.4 0.34 7.1 0.77
(20.3, 62.5) (0.24, 0.54) (4.5, 12.3) (0.50, 1.28)
Standard EPO denition 36.2 0.38 8.1 0.85
(20.2, 69.0) (0.24, 0.58) (4.7, 14.5) (0.51, 1.45)
A related concern is that patent counts would omit any EU ETS response that
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appears in the form of a change in the quality of patents. To address this concern, we
test whether the EU ETS has systematically changed the number of citations received by
low-carbon patents held by EU ETS relative to non-EU ETS rms. Our results, reported
in table 9, indicate that the EU ETS has not had a signicant impact on patent quality.
Table 9: Changes in quality of low-carbon patents
Additional citations per rm 2.25
(-0.99, 17.99)
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